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Abstract
Despite many theories and algorithms for decision–making, after esti-
mating the utility function the choice is usually made by maximising
its expected value (the max EU principle). This traditional and ‘ratio-
nal’ conclusion of the decision–making process is compared in this paper
with several ‘irrational’ techniques that make choice in Monte–Carlo fash-
ion. The comparison is made by evaluating the performance of simple
decision–theoretic agents in stochastic environments. It is shown that
not only the random choice strategies can achieve performance compa-
rable to the max EU method, but under certain conditions the Monte–
Carlo choice methods perform almost two times better than the max EU.
The paper concludes by quoting evidence from recent cognitive modelling
works as well as the famous decision–making paradoxes.
1 Introduction
During the last several decades, the theory of decision–making under uncer-
tainty has received an extensive treatment by scientists. The most prominent
contributions have been made by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), Sav-
age (1954), Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Despite the diﬀerences in their
approach to uncertainty (i.e. objective or subjective), the notion of utility has
been successfully used to compute the preferences of a decision–maker. Theo-
ries such as the dynamic programming by Bellman (1957) and the reinforcement
learning partly due to Sutton and Barto (1981) have enabled us to compute
the utilities necessary for optimal decision–making. Combined with probabilis-
tic inference (e.g. the Bayes’ conditional probability rule), these theories have
been used successfully in decision–theoretic agents and robots that can learn
autonomously and ﬁnd solutions to various problems.
Despite these successes, however, soon after its emergence the theory of ra-
tional decision–making has been strongly criticised by some psychologists and
economists. One simple counter example is the so–called rational donkey para-
dox, when a donkey is placed between two identical haystacks. If the donkey is
perfectly rational (i.e. chooses according to the max EU principle), then it will
not be able to choose between alternatives with equal EUs. Therefore, some
additional mechanism must be involved in choosing, such as a roulette wheel.
Moreover, it has been noticed experimentally that human subjects always ex-
press some degree of randomness in their choice behaviour even in situations
when the choice they make seems irrational according to their previous experi-
ence (Myers, Fort, Katz, & Suydam, 1963). The latest cognitive architectures,
such as Act–r (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), use noise in the utility in order
to model the ‘imperfect’ choice behaviour of humans or animals. Several stud-
ies have demonstrated recently that this noisy and ‘irrational’ component of
decision–making may in fact play an important function optimising the be-
haviour in stochastic environments (Belavkin & Ritter, 2003).
Another famous and powerful counter example to the theory of rational
choice has been suggested by Allais (1953) (also known as the Allais paradox)
that showed how the theory failed to compute a preference between decisions,
which on the other hand was obvious to most of the human subjects. One
version of this problem is as follows. Consider a choice between two lotteries:
1. 1/3 chance of winning £300 or 2/3 of not winning anything;
2. A sure win of £100.
One can easily check that two lotteries have equal expected utilities (£100 ex-
actly). Thus, there should be no preference according to the max EU principle.
However, most of us (about 70%) would prefer the second lottery demonstrating
risk–averse behaviour. Interestingly, when the problem is presented with gains
replaced by losses (i.e. loosing money instead of winning), then the preferences
of subjects also revert, and a risk–taking behaviour is observed. This paradox
has been observed in many experiments using diﬀerent interpretations. One
of the most famous is the study by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), and sev-
eral theories, such as the framing and prospect theories (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981), have been proposed to explain these observations. However, most of the
theories do not explain the uncertainty that is always present in preferences
and choice behaviour of subjects.
In this paper, agents that do not use the max EU principle will be con-
sidered. Instead, a Monte–Carlo technique will be used to make decisions ran-
domly (i.e. by drawing samples from probability distributions). These methods
will be compared with the more traditional choice strategy by maximising the
EUs of decisions. The performance will be analysed using both direct measures
of performance as well as information theoretic concepts. Thus, the main fo-
cus of this work is the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent choice methods, especially in
stochastic environments.
A simple decision–theoretic agent architecture and the experimental setup
will be described in the ﬁrst two sections. The results of the tests will be
reported in the third section. It will be shown experimentally that although
the random methods may lead sometimes to irrational decisions, on average
they perform as good as the rational ones, and often signiﬁcantly outperform
them.
The concluding section will discuss the results in the view of psychologi-
cal evidence as well as the cognitive modelling research. Although resolving
the paradoxes of decision–making, mentioned above, was not the goal of this
study, some interesting observations will be made that may explain the results
observed experimentally.
2 A Simple Decision–Theoretic Architecture
In this section, the design of a very simple decision–theoretic agent will be out-
lined. This agent will be able to explore its environment, learn and improve its
performance according to some criteria. First, let us introduce some notation.
Let X = {x1, . . . , xm} be a set of states that an agent can occupy in the
world, and let Z = {z1, . . . , zn} be a set of actions that the agent can execute.
Each action can transfer the agent from one state to another: xj = zk(xi). For
convenience of notation, let us denote the set of new states as Y = {y1, . . . , ym}.
Thus, the agent implements a mapping Z : X → Y . In stochastic environments,
this mapping is not deterministic and can be described by the probability dis-
tribution
P (X,Y, Z) =






p1m1 · · · p1mm

 · · ·






pnm1 · · · pnmm

 ,
where pkij = P (xi, yj, zk) is the joint probability of transition from xi to yj by
executing zk. In Markov decision problems, matrix (pkij) is called the transition
model. If the agent has no preference between states of the world or actions,
then a transition to any state is allowed, and distribution P (X,Y, Z) may be
uniform. Let us assume that the agent prefers some states to the others. For
example, an agent may loose energy in state i faster than in j, and therefore
i  j (where  denotes binary preference relation). Thus, agent’s actions
should make transitions to the more preferable states more often.
Traditionally, preferences are expressed by a utility, which is a map from
states to real numbers U : X → R. Note, however, that the real numbers are,
in fact, not necessary, as only countable sets of states can be ordered by utility.
In this paper, we shall consider the uncertainty about utility to be both due to
the stochastic nature of the world (i.e. objective uncertainty) and due to the
lack of information about its distribution (i.e subjective uncertainty). Thus,
we follow the Anscombe and Aumann theory.
Because perception is not in the scope of this paper, let us assume that
an agent can ideally recognise the states of the world and which actions it
performs. We also assume that the agent can assess correctly the utility of the
current state.
The associations between states and actions are recorded by the agent’s
memory Mkji, which is a matrix with elements simply counting each transi-
tion. The reader should be able to check that after normalisation, the mem-
ory Mkji represents the transition model P (X,Y, Z). Initially, the memory of
an agent contains no information. In information theoretic terms, this corre-
sponds to the maximum of entropy H(X,Y, Z) = E{− lnP (X,Y, Z)}. The
maximum is achieved when P (X,Y, Z) is uniform, and the reader can check
that maxH(X,Y, Z) = ln(m × m × n). Note that this information theoretic
approach allows us to avoid the argument of objective and subjective probabil-
ities: The prior distribution is deﬁned through the absence of information.
The agent also has a memory for utilities U(X) of the states it has visited.
This memory also has no information initially (i.e. utilities of all states are
equal). Because no states are preferred, and all transition probabilities are
equal initially, the agent starts acting completely randomly. By exploring the
world in such a manner, the agent can assess and learn its preferences U(X) (i.e.
which states have been ‘better’ in the past). Consequently, some transitions
should become more probable than others, and the entropy H(X,Y, Z) should
decrease as a result of changes in probabilities. This change can be evaluated
by computing mutual information between variables X , Y and Z:
I(X,Y, Z) = H(X) + H(Y ) + H(Z)−H(X,Y, Z) ,
where H(X), H(Y ) and H(Z) are marginal entropies (i.e. for P (X), P (Y ) and
P (Z)), while H(X,Y, Z) is the entropy of joint distribution P (X,Y, Z). If X ,
Y and Z are statistically independent, then P (X,Y, Z) = P (X)P (Y )P (Z),
and I(X,Y, Z) = 0. Positive values of I(X,Y, Z) mean that an agent has
developed preferences.
Finally, let us consider how the memory of an agent can be optimised in
terms of storage requirements. Suppose that there are several states with
exactly the same utility: ∃x1, x2 ∈ X : U(x1) = U(x2). This means that
the agent has no preference between these states. We can reduce the size of
the transition model Mkji by considering states only with diﬀerent utilities:
Y ⊆ X : y1 = y2 ⇒ U(y1) = U(y2) ∀ y1, y2 ∈ Y . The cardinality of set Y
should be the same as of set U , and it is smaller than cardinality of X . By or-
dering elements of Y according to U the separate storage for utilities becomes
redundant. In this notation, the transitional model implements the Savage
approach (i.e. actions map from states to utilities).
In this paper, we shall consider an extreme case when utility divides the
world into two subsets of states: S (successes) and F (failures). Thus, Y =
{S, F}. Although this is a crude approximation, it is useful to understand the
diﬀerence in performance of agents with reduced sets of future states. Note,
that such a binary approach has been already successfully used to model hu-
man and animal behaviour. The Act–r cognitive architecture (Anderson &
Lebiere, 1998), mentioned earlier, uses the notion of successes and failures to re-
inforce probabilities of production rules. Many unsupervised and reinforcement
learning algorithms also employ binary reward functions.
In the next section, three methods for choosing an action will be presented.
These methods are the only architectural diﬀerence between the three types of
agents tested in this paper.
3 Rational and Irrational Choice
One of the greatest results of probability theory is the relation between condi-
tional probability and joint distribution (known as the Bayes formula)
P (X | Y, Z) = αP (X,Y, Z) , (1)
where α is the normalising constant. As has been mentioned earlier, the asso-
ciative memory Mkij of an agent after normalisation represents the joint distri-
bution P (X,Y, Z), which can be used for inference. Indeed, given a transitional
model, we can estimate the probability of future outcomes yj conditional to the
current state xi and actions taken zk.
3.1 The Maximum Expected Utility
The traditional approach to decision–making is to maximise the expected utility
of future states
zk = arg max
zk∈Z
E{U} , where E{U} =
∑
yj∈Y
P (yj | xi, zk)U(yj)
Agents using this approach behave ‘rationally’ always choosing what seems to
be the best action. The ﬁrst criticism of this method is that there is no way of
choosing an action if expected utilities are equal (and they are at the beginning
when no information is available). This problem has been mentioned earlier as
the rational donkey paradox. To overcome this limitation, some Gaussian noise
of relatively small variance is usually introduced which corrupts the expected
utilities by some random values. This approach is used by the Act–r cognitive
architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), and the noise has allowed for mod-
elling many experiments on human and animals’ choice behaviour. The max
EU agent, described in the experiments below, used randomness only when the
expected utilities were equal. This is equivalent to adding noise of a very small
variance.
Another potential drawback we can notice in this method is that only the
ﬁrst moments of utility distributions are used (i.e. the expected values of
utilities). The variance and all other potentially useful characteristics of utility
distributions are ignored. This may explain the lack of exploration in behaviour
of agents using this principle. Indeed, immediately after experiencing the ﬁrst
success, the agent switches to using only the successful action.
3.2 Random Utility
Although small noise can help agents to resolve some problems, it is not clear
how large should be the variance of noise corrupting the utilities. Moreover,
studies in cognitive modelling of choice behaviour have suggested recently that
noise variance should be dynamic. It has been proposed by Belavkin and Ritter
(2004) that noise variance should be proportional to the variance of the utility
distributions (i.e. the second moments of their distributions). This can be
implemented in the following way: Given current state xi and particular action
zk, the future state yj can be drawn randomly from its probability distribution,
which is inferred using the Bayes formula (1). The utility map U can be used
to asses the utility uj = U(yj) of such a random state. An action zk can be
chosen by maximising uj for all actions in Z
zk = arg max
zk∈Z
u(yj) , where yj ← P (Y | xi, zk)
This method implements choice by random utilities drawn from their proba-
bility distributions, and this allows the agent to act randomly when there is
little knowledge about the environment. Indeed, when distributions are close
to uniform, their variances are large and there is no clear preference between
states. On the contrary, when the agent forms strong preferences, the variance
also reduces. Interestingly, this implements a search strategy somewhat similar
to the simulated annealing algorithm (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, & Vecchi, 1983),
because the variance is reducing on average, but it also may increase if the
agent ﬁnds itself in a local maxima.
3.3 Random Action
In this third variation, instead of maximising the utility of future states, the
actions are selected directly from their probability distributions. Indeed, we
can consider the following conditional probability:
P (Z | X,Y ) = αP (X,Y, Z)
Given the utility map U , we can always select future state yj ∈ Y maximising
the utility (in fact, in our notation Y is a partially ordered set). The action
can be drawn from the probability distribution conditional to the current state
xi and the maximum utility state ymax
zk ← P (Z | xi, ymax) , where ymax = arg max
yj∈Y
U(yj)
Again, the agent will choose actions randomly if the joint distribution is uni-
form. If, however, some actions lead to the maximum utility state more often,
then after some training the behaviour should become more ‘rational’.
Although there is an obvious diﬀerence between the max EU and the random
choice strategies, it is not so clear how diﬀerent are the last two methods. One
may notice that cardinalities of sets Y and Z are quite diﬀerent. Thus, the
probability distributions of Y and Z also have diﬀerent properties and possibly
diﬀerent rates of convergence.
4 Experiment Description
For the purpose of simplicity, the experiments were conducted with environ-
ments of small number of discrete states each of which can have a reward (e.g.
food) or not. Thus, reward of each state is either 0 or 1. In the experiments,
described below, a one–dimensional world of only ﬁve states has been used.
The agent can also perform only three actions: Stay in the same place, move
left or move right.
In this paper, the utility function does not take into account the length of
sequence, and therefore we do not consider environmental histories. Again, this
is done for simplicity, but the results can be generalised later for utilities that
take into account the length of sequence or time. In fact, such a setup is an
extreme case of decaying utility with zero decay time.
On each step, the agent records the following information into its memory:
The transition mkij from state xi to a new state yj (or utility) using action zk.
If the agent moves to the state with a reward, then the reward is collected.
The rewards can re–appear at diﬀerent places of the world either randomly
or according to some pattern. Three diﬀerent patterns have been used in the
tests:
Random : rewards can occur in any place of the world with equal probability.
Poor : the number of places in the world, where rewards can occur, is smaller
than the number of places without rewards.
Rich : the number of places with rewards is larger than the number of places
without.
The rates, at which the rewards regenerate in the world, can also be changed.
The experiments have been run using several rates of rewards changing from
very low to very high rates.
Two main criteria have been used to measure the performance of the agents:
1. The proportion of rewards collected (i.e. a percentage of rewards collected
out of all rewards that have appeared).
2. The increase of mutual information between states and actions.
In the next section, the results of tests are reported.
5 Results of the Experiments
Figure 1 compares the performance of three decision theoretic agents in com-
pletely random (top), poor (middle) and rich (bottom) worlds. The ordinates
on the charts show the percentage of rewards collected by the agents out of
all rewards appearing in identical environments and during the same period of
time. One can see that very similar performance is achieved by all three agents.
For the random pattern (top graph of Figure 1), because the probability of any
place containing a reward was the same, all agents have collected similar num-
ber of rewards. There seems to be a small variation in the performance when
the rate of rewards is the lowest, but this can be explained by the small number
of rewards. For all other rates, the performance of all agents is almost identical.
For the poor (middle) and the rich (bottom) patterns, the number of rewards
collected is greater than for the random world, which indicates that all agents
were able to learn where to expect the rewards.
Interestingly, although the number of rewards collected is very similar, the
behaviour of agents is very diﬀerent: The max EU agent most of the time
‘preferred’ to stay in the same place, and therefore collected only those rewards
that appeared in the same place. On the contrary, both random agents have




























Figure 1: Proportion of rewards collected as a function of rewards frequency
for random (top), poor (middle) and rich (bottom) patterns.
One can see that although agents use diﬀerent tactics for action selection,
their performance in terms of number of rewards is very similar. This is an
interesting result because two of the agents are not using the traditional max
EU principle, and one would expect them to have a disadvantage.
Figure 2 illustrates results of agents with binary representation of future
states (i.e. Y = {S, F}). One can see the dramatic change in performance:































Figure 2: Proportion of rewards collected as a function of rewards frequency
for random (top), poor (middle) and rich (bottom) patterns.
states. Perhaps, this result can be explained by the smaller size of the transition
model, and hence its ability to learn and re–learn faster.
Furthermore, the charts demonstrate that randomly acting agents have per-
formed better than the max EU agent: At low and medium rates of rewards
and rewards occurring according to some regular patterns, the randomly acting
agents have collected almost two times more rewards. This result is due to a
more explorative behaviour of random agents as opposed to the max EU agent
that tends to over–exploit some options. Perhaps, in stochastic worlds with
scarce resources, exploration is a more beneﬁcial strategy.
Finally, one may notice that the best performance was demonstrated by the































Figure 3: Mutual information acquired as a function of rewards frequency for
random (top), poor (middle) and rich (bottom) patterns.
one reason that may be considered is that these agents used three actions (stay,
move left and right) and two possible utilities (success and failure). Perhaps,
a smaller cardinality of a set contributes to a faster learning of the probability
distribution over this set. However, this hypothesis is yet to be tested.
Figure 3 shows the amount of mutual information I(X,Y, Z) accumulated
in these tests. One can see that the random utility agent (the one that has the
best performance) has acquired the least amount of information in almost all
cases. Moreover, the charts show that too much mutual information hinders
the performance. Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, positive mutual informa-
tion reﬂects the amount of preferences formed by the agent. However, excessive
preference to particular states or actions may lead to over–exploitation and not
suﬃcient exploration, which is not a beneﬁcial strategy in stochastic worlds.
This is particularly well illustrated by the top graphs of Figures 2 and 3 com-
paring the performance and mutual information for a completely random world:
The max EU agent has the worst performance, but accumulated more infor-
mation than the ‘irrational’ agents. This result, however, does not reﬂect the
reality of the world: There is no regular pattern of rewards, and therefore a
preference for a particular state is unnecessary.
6 Discussion
In this paper, methods for choosing actions alternative to the traditional max-
imum expected utility have been tested. The simulations, described here,
demonstrated that Monte–Carlo techniques can achieve better performance in
stochastic environments because they facilitate a more explorative strategy.
Moreover, the balance between exploitation and exploration is maintained due
to the characteristics of probability distributions other than the expected val-
ues (i.e. moments of higher order than one, such as variance). In addition, the
simulations showed that the performance can be improved by reducing the size
of the transitional model. This is achieved by considering the set of utilities
instead of the set of future states as in traditional Markov decision models.
The idea of dynamic randomness in decision–making proportional to the
variance of probability distributions has been discussed recently in the cognitive
modelling society: Models that used adaptive dynamic noise in the utilities of
production rules matched better the data from studies on animal learning (see
Belavkin & Ritter, 2003). The dynamics of noise variance was shown to be
proportional to the entropy associated with the success in the task as well as the
variance of utilities of the rules. The simulations with such a dynamic control
over the uncertainty in decision–making have also achieved better learning and
adaptation of behaviour. These results correspond well to the outcomes of the
simulations reported in this paper.
An interesting question is whether the random utility theory can also ex-
plain why people demonstrate clear preferences in situations when the expected
utility theory suggests no preference between decisions, as in the Allais para-
dox described in the Introduction. Recall that subjects were asked to choose
between two alternative lotteries (one with only 1/3 chance of winning £300
and another with a sure win of £100). Although both alternatives had equal
expected utilities of £100, the majority of subjects (about 70%) preferred the
second lottery. This behaviour can be explained by the random utility choice
method, described earlier in this paper. Note that in the ﬁrst lottery, we should
win nothing two out of three times, while in the second lottery we always win
£100. Thus, according to the random utility method, two out of three times
the random utility of the ﬁrst option is smaller than that of the second. Re-
markably, this proportion also reﬂects the fact that only about 70% of subjects
choose the second lottery, but not all (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The
reader may check that the risk–taking behaviour for the reversed version of this
problem (i.e. loosing money instead of winning) can also be explained in this
fashion.
Although explaining the decision–making paradoxes was not among the
main intentions of this research, it is an interesting outcome. It seems that the
random decision–making, as opposed to the expected utility theory, promises
not only a better performance for agent architectures, but also a better theory
for cognitive scientists.
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